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Internal and external governance mechanisms: their impact on the 
performance of large UK public companies 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses the relationship between internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms and the performance of UK companies within the 
context of the Cadbury Committee’s Code of Best Practice. The results show, 
first, that the market for corporate control is an effective governance 
mechanism that may be regarded as a substitute for the other mechanisms. 
Second, there is a weak relationship between the internal governance 
mechanisms and performance. Third, there is also little evidence that with 
firms in the top and bottom performance deciles have different internal 
governance characteristics. The results therefore raise questions about the 
efficacy of imposing prescriptive internal governance mechanisms on 
companies, particularly given that the market for corporate control has been 
shown to be an effective means of reducing agency costs. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance, internal and external mechanisms. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
The agency model proposes a number of corporate governance mechanisms 
that are designed to reduce the agency costs associated with the separation 
of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980 and Fama 
and Jensen 1983). Their purpose is to align shareholder and manager 
interests. Governance mechanisms can be split into two categories, internal 
and external. Internal mechanisms include board structure variables such as 
duality and the proportion of non-executive directors, debt financing and 
executive director shareholdings. The key external mechanism is the market 
for corporate control, which acts as a mechanism of last resort, Jensen 
(1986a). The probability of replacement following acquisition provides a direct 
incentive for top management to perform well, (Martin and McConnell 1991 
and Kennedy and Limmack 1996).  
 
A number of recent reports into the governance of UK companies have 
focused attention on the importance of the internal governance mechanisms, 
particularly those relating to board structures and board subcommittees, 
(Cadbury 1992, Greenbury 1995 and Hampel 1998). The key report, Cadbury, 
recommended that publicly quoted firms should adopt the specified internal 
governance structures contained within a Code of Best Practice.1 Although it 
was voluntary, firms were expected to comply with the governance structures 
recommended in the Code. Further, the London Stock Exchange required all 
quoted companies to include in their annual report the extent to which they 
had complied with the Code of Best Practice. If the recommended structures 
were not in place, a clear rationale had to be given to shareholders. UK 
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board-related governance mechanisms are therefore, to a large degree, 
prescriptive. 
 
In terms of board structures, Cadbury recommended that the same person 
should not fill the board’s two most powerful posts, those of chief executive 
officer and chairman. Cadbury identified two other structural mechanisms as 
being of particular importance. First, that the number of non-executive 
directors2 should be sufficient to have a significant impact on board decisions 
and second, that board sub-committees were important. Cadbury also 
stressed the importance of the independence and calibre of non-executive 
directors.  
 
There has been widespread acceptance of the Committee’s 
recommendations, particularly in relation to the appointment of board sub-
committees, (Conyon and Mallin 1997). Further, compliance has resulted in 
significant changes to board-related mechanisms, (Weir and Laing 1999 and 
Young 2000). They show that since the Cadbury Report was published, UK 
quoted companies have increased non-executive director representation, 
reduced the incidence of duality and that the presence of board 
subcommittees, such as the audit and remuneration committees, is now much 
more frequently reported.  
 
UK governance therefore places emphasis on the internal, structural 
governance mechanisms. However, there is evidence to suggest that 
governance mechanisms are not independent of each other but are 
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substitutes, Rediker and Seth (1995) and Kini et al (1995). Therefore, 
emphasising the importance of a particular governance mechanism, or a 
small group of governance mechanisms, ignores such interdependence, 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). This problem is reflected in previous studies of 
corporate governance that have tended to concentrate too much on the 
influence of internal mechanisms at the expense of external mechanisms such 
as the market for corporate control.  
 
The paper therefore contributes to the governance literature in a number of 
ways. First, it recognises the substitutability of internal and external 
governance mechanisms. The key external mechanism, the market for 
corporate control, has been the subject of much analysis. However, studies 
have tended to look at the situation at the time of acquisition and then 
attempted to identify ineffective internal mechanisms in place at that time. As 
a result, little is known about the way in which the market for corporate control 
acts as a substitute mechanism for firms that are not actually taken-over. For 
example, given the increased chance of job loss post-acquisition, the 
management of firms faced with the threat of acquisition has an incentive to 
improve performance and so reduce that threat. 
 
Using a sample of UK quoted companies, we find that the market for 
corporate control is an effective mechanism and may therefore be regarded 
as a substitute for other governance mechanisms. Our results suggest that 
the omission of a market for corporate control variable may help to explain the 
mixed results reported in earlier studies into the performance-governance 
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relationship.  We find only weak evidence that board structural mechanisms 
affect performance, which is consistent with the hypothesis of substitutability 
between mechanisms. An awareness of the interrelationship between internal 
and external mechanisms is likely to become more important as companies 
move towards prescribed internal governance structures in line with the Code 
of Best Practice. By including a market for corporate control variable, the 
paper also addresses the methodological issue of omitted variable bias, which 
may be present in studies that ignore the potential interrelationships between 
the governance mechanisms. 
 
Second, the paper contributes to the debate concerning the form of 
governance in the UK. The UK system, which incorporates a Code of Best 
Practice, is based on recommended internal governance mechanisms. An 
alternative approach would be to give individual firms greater freedom to 
choose the mechanisms that suit their specific circumstances, a situation that 
applies in the US. For example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that, 
given the opportunity, firms will make optimal choices in relation to their 
internal governance structures. However, with less freedom to choose, 
internal governance mechanisms will become increasingly homogeneous and 
this will make it more difficult to ascertain which of them are effective. This 
raises important public policy questions about the usefulness of having 
prescribed internal governance mechanisms. Thus, if firms comply with 
Cadbury and adopt similar internal mechanisms, it will not be possible to 
identify the internal governance failings that may explain poor performance. 
We find little evidence that board structure affects performance which 
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suggests that compliance, or otherwise, provides the shareholder with limited 
information. 
 
Third, the paper addresses the fact that relatively little has been done to 
assess the impact of subcommittee structure on performance, (Bhagat and 
Black 1998, Dalton et al 1998). This lack of empirical evidence is important in 
the UK context given the importance attached to board subcommittees in the 
Code of Best Practice. Our results indicate that the structure and quality of 
board subcommittees have little impact on performance. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the relevant 
literature and issues relating to internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms. It also sets out the hypotheses to be tested. The third section 
describes the data and variables used in the analysis. The fourth section 
discusses the results. Finally, the main issues brought out in the analysis are 
discussed and some conclusions drawn. 
 
2 GOVERNANCE CONTROL MECHANISMS AND TESTABLE 
HYPOTHESES 
Agency costs are incurred when, in the face of information asymmetry, 
principals introduce monitoring mechanisms designed to align management 
and shareholder interests.  There are a variety of reasons why managers may 
prefer to pursue their own objectives to the detriment of shareholders. For 
example, status, remuneration and job security tend to be linked to company 
size rather than to company performance. This section considers the 
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mechanisms available to reduce agency costs and to provide incentives to 
managers to pursue shareholder interests. Specifically, the mechanisms to be 
considered are board structure, board monitoring committee structure and 
director quality, director shareholdings, debt financing, institutional 
shareholdings, and the market for corporate control. This approach takes 
account of the fact that a company’s performance is likely to be influenced by 
a number of agency mechanisms rather than just one. It is therefore important 
to allow for possible substitutability between the internal and external control 
mechanisms. For example, the threat of take-over may compensate for the 
presence of duality or a relatively small proportion of non-executive directors.   
 
The composition of board structure is an important mechanism because the 
presence of non-executive directors represents a means of monitoring the 
actions of the executive directors and of ensuring that the executive directors 
are pursuing policies consistent with shareholders’ interests, (Fama 1980). 
Peasnell et al (1998) report that 44% of UK boards are non-executive 
directors with 31% of the board being defined as independent. Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998) find that UK boards have an average of 39% non-executive 
directors with 33% of the board being defined as independent. UK boards, 
therefore, have a clear majority of executive directors. In contrast, US boards 
are dominated by outside directors, for example Bhagat and Black (1998) find 
an average of 76% outside directors on US boards and Klein (1998) reports a 
figure of 77%. These differences suggest that we should be cautious about 
generalising the results of US studies to the UK, for it appears that US outside 
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directors may be in a better position to monitor executive director actions than 
their UK counterparts. 
 
Non-executive directors possess two characteristics that enable them to fulfil 
their monitoring function. First, their independence (Cadbury 1992) and 
second, they are concerned to maintain their reputation in the external labour 
market (Fama and Jensen 1983).  
 
Although non-executive directors may possess certain characteristics such as 
independence and experience, the evidence relating to their impact on 
performance tends not to support this positive perspective. A number of 
studies find that the presence of independent directors may actually harm 
performance suggesting that they do not bring the requisite skills to the job. 
Thus if there is pressure to increase outside director representation, it may be 
that there are insufficient directors of the necessary quality available to do the 
job effectively. Yermack (1996) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find a 
negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
performance. However, their results do not hold across performance 
measures. Bhagat and Black (1998) report a similar negative relationship, but 
show that it holds for a variety of performance measures over a period of 
years. In the UK, Weir and Laing (1999) also found a negative relationship 
between non-executive director representation and performance. However, 
given the possible simultaneous nature of the relationship, it may be that poor 
performance resulted in an increase in the number of non-executive directors 
rather than being the cause of the poor performance. 
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 In contrast, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) and Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) find no relationship between board composition and performance when 
both relate to the same year. Evidence that the existence of a time lag may be 
present, is suggested by Baysinger and Butler (1985) who report a ten-year 
lagged relationship. However, the practical implications of such a long time lag 
are not clear. Stronger support for the positive impact of non-executive 
directors comes from event study analysis. This has tended to show that the 
appointment of non-executive directors increases company value, Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1990 and 1997) and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999).  
 
Given that the Code of Best Practice recommends that there should be a 
significant representation of non-executive directors and that they should be 
independent, the following two-part hypothesis is proposed: 
H1a:  There will be a positive relationship between the proportion of non-
 executive directors and performance. 
H1b: There will be a positive relationship between the proportion of 
 independent non-executive directors and performance. 
 
A further board structure control mechanism relates to duality, which occurs 
when the same person undertakes the combined roles of chief executive 
officer and chairman of the board. The agency model argues that boards 
dominated by executive directors are more difficult to control, a situation that 
would clearly apply to duality (Fama and Jensen 1983). The potential 
advantage of having the same person occupy both positions is that they 
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should exhibit a greater understanding and knowledge of the company’s 
operating environment. The Cadbury Committee supported the former view 
and regarded the practice as undesirable because it gave one person too 
much power within the decision-making process (Cadbury 1992). The Code of 
Best Practice therefore recommended that there should be a clear division of 
responsibilities and if that duality did occur, there had to be sufficient 
independence on the board to counterbalance the situation. 
 
However, there is little evidence to support Cadbury’s stance that duality is 
undesirable. In the US, Boyd (1995) found that duality actually led to better 
performance. In contrast, Baliga et al (1996), Brickley et al (1997) and Dalton 
et al (1998) all found that it had no effect on performance. UK studies tend to 
support this with Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and Weir and Laing (1999) 
finding that duality did not harm performance, although neither did it improve 
it. Given the recommendation within the Code of Best Practice, the second 
hypothesis is: 
H2:  There is a negative relationship between the presence of duality and 
 company performance. 
 
Not only did the Cadbury Report identify specific preferred board structures, it 
also recommended that all quoted companies should establish internal board 
sub-committees. Consistent with the agency model, the Report argued that 
audit committees were an additional control mechanism that ensured that 
shareholder interests were being safeguarded. This was achieved by 
promoting the effective financial management of the company and increasing 
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accountability, (Cadbury 1992). An effective audit committee should bring a 
number of potential benefits. These include helping the board to meet its 
statutory and fiduciary responsibilities by improving links between the board 
and the external and internal auditors. Audit committees should therefore 
improve the credibility of financial statements, something that benefits 
shareholders and other users of the information, Collier (1997).  
 
In addition to recommending that an audit committee should be established, 
Cadbury also proposed that the committee should have a minimum of three 
members and should consist only of non-executive directors, the majority of 
whom should be independent. Thus audit committees represent another 
internal governance mechanism, the impact of which should be to improve the 
quality of the financial management of the company and hence its 
performance.  
 
Relatively little has been reported about the impact of audit committees on 
performance. Vafeas (1999) finds that board subcommittee structure and 
quality provide insights into those responsible for undertaking the monitoring 
roles within companies. Wild (1994) shows that the market reacted more 
favourably to earnings reports after an audit committee had been established. 
Klein (1998) reported that neither the presence of an audit committee nor its 
structure had an effect on a range of accounting and market performance 
measures. Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) also found no evidence to support 
the view that the structure of board subcommittees significantly affected 
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performance.  However, given the recommendation in the Code, the third 
hypothesis is: 
H3a:  There is a positive relationship between the presence of an audit 
 committee and company performance. 
H3b:  There is a positive relationship between the independence of the 
 members of an audit committee and company performance. 
 
The external labour market provides a measure of the returns earned by 
directors. One way of measuring these returns is by the number of additional 
directorships held by a director. The greater the number of additional boards a 
director is asked to serve on, the greater the reputation and standing of that 
director. Additional directorships may therefore be regarded as a proxy for 
director quality. Assuming the market for directors is efficient, higher quality 
directors should be more closely associated with the promotion of shareholder 
interests and better company performance.  
 
There is some evidence that director quality, as measured by the average 
number of additional directorships held by board members, has a positive 
effect on performance, Dowen (1995). The relationship was stronger using 
accounting, rather than market, performance. In another US study, Klein 
(1998) found a weak relationship between performance and director quality if 
Jensen’s Productivity was used to measure performance. However, she found 
no relationship between the proportion of directors with additional 
directorships if alternative accounting and market measures of performance 
were used.  
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 Cadbury argued that the effectiveness of an audit committee depended in part 
on the quality of the non-executive members. It is therefore important that 
non-executive directors should be of a sufficient calibre to lend weight to their 
opinions. Hence given the recommendations in the Code of Best Practice, the 
fourth hypothesis states: 
H4:  There is a positive relationship between the quality of non-executive 
 directors on the audit committee and company performance. 
 
Another possible solution to the agency problem is to provide senior 
management with incentives to pursue wealth maximising policies. These 
incentives may take the form of shares in the company. The greater the 
financial stake, the greater the costs incurred by not maximising shareholder 
wealth, Jensen and Meckling (1976). This convergence-of-interest model 
argues that there is a linear relationship between director shareholding and 
performance. However, beyond a certain shareholding, directors may prefer 
to pursue non-wealth maximising goals to gain, for example, tax advantages 
associated with consuming perquisites. This leads to managerial 
entrenchment whereby other shareholders are unable to influence the actions 
of the directors, Morck et al (1988). A number of studies have found a non-
linear relationship between director shareholding and performance, McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Griffith (1999) and Short 
and Keasey (1999). Given the weight of evidence, the fifth hypothesis is:  
H5:  There is a negative non-linear relationship between director 
 shareholdings and performance. 
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 Debt financing is another internal governance mechanism whereby increased 
debt reduces free cash flow and so limits managerial discretion, Jensen 
(1986b). Rather than spending any excess funds on projects that have 
negative net present values, debt requires managers to use these funds to 
service the company’s debt. This gives the sixth hypothesis: 
H6:  There is a positive relationship between leverage and company 
performance. 
 
External shareholdings are those held by institutions, blockholders and 
individuals outside the company. The greater the shareholding, the greater 
the potential agency costs incurred by poor performance. Therefore, as 
externally held shareholdings increase, there is a greater incentive to 
undertake more effective monitoring. The evidence tends to support the 
hypothesis that increased institutional shareholdings leads to better 
performance. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) for the US and Leech 
and Leahy (1991) for the UK find a positive relationship between external 
shareholdings and performance. Therefore the seventh hypothesis is: 
H7:  There is a positive relationship between external shareholdings and 
 performance. 
 
If a company’s internal mechanisms fail, the market for corporate control acts 
as a disciplining mechanism of last resort, Jensen (1986a). Inappropriate 
internal mechanisms will manifest themselves in poor company performance. 
This will result in a tender offer being made as other management teams 
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attempt to gain control of the company. There is a large literature dealing with 
the relationship between performance and take-overs with Powell (1997) 
providing a useful overview. He finds that the characteristics of hostile and 
friendly bids are different and that the impacts of the characteristics change 
over time. In relation to governance characteristics, Weir (1997) found that 
governance mechanisms such as the percentage of non-executive directors 
and duality affected the probability of acquisition by means of a hostile bid. 
There is also evidence that the quality of non-executive directors significantly 
affects the likelihood of acquisition, Shivdasani (1993) and O’Sullivan and 
Wong (1999). In addition, it has been shown that CEOs are more likely to lose 
their jobs following hostile take-overs, Martin and McConnell (1991) and 
Kennedy and Limmack (1996). Hence, if the threat of take-over provides 
incentives to improve performance, we hypothesise that: 
H8: There is a positive relationship between the threat of take-over and 
 company performance 
 
We also include a number of control variables. Company size is expected to 
be negatively related to performance, Fama and French (1992). Capital 
expenditure is a measure of potential future returns, Lang et al (1989), and 
there should be a positive relationship between capital expenditure and 
performance. 
 
3. MODELS, METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLES 
Given the discussion above, the following general model is specified: 
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QRATIOi = 0 + 1BOARD + 2INCENTIVE + 3QUALITY + 4COMMITTEE + 
5TAKEOVER + 6LEVERAGE + 7CONTROL  +i    (1) 
where 
QRATIO - is defined as market capitalisation plus total debt divided by total 
assets. It is a proxy for Tobin’s Q which measures performance in terms of 
company valuation, (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996,McConnell and Servaes 
1995, Short and Keasey 1999). It is maintained that Q is a proxy for how 
closely shareholder and manager interests have been aligned. The higher the 
value of Q, the more effective the governance mechanisms and the better the 
market’s perception of the company’s performance. In contrast, lower values 
of Q suggest less effective governance mechanisms and greater managerial 
discretion.   
BOARD - represents the board structure variables: NX, INDNX, AUD and 
DUAL. 
INCENTIVE - includes the incentive shareholding variables: CEOSHR1, 
CEOSHRSQ and EXT. 
TAKEOVER - measures take-over probability by sector: PROBTO 
QUALITY - is a measure of audit committee quality: AUDADD. 
COMMITTEE - measures audit committee structure: AUDNX, AUDINDNX and 
AUDKEY. 
LEVERAGE - represents the availability of free cash flow.  
CONTROL - represents the control variables: SALES and CAPEX. 
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
NX - is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board of each 
company.   
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NXIND - is the percentage of independent non-executive directors on the 
board. A director is defined as independent if he/she had not previously been 
an executive director with the company or does not have a senior post with a 
firm’s advisors. The definition excludes auditors, lawyers and other advisors 
such as management consultants but includes non-executive directors who 
are employed in senior positions in the companies’ banks (Gilson 1990). 
AUD - is a dummy variable that has a value of one if a company has an audit 
committee and zero if it does not.  
DUAL - is a dummy variable that equals one if a company combines the posts 
of chief executive officer and chairman and zero if it does not.  
CEOSHR - is the total percentage shareholdings of the chief executive officer 
or executive chairman.  
CEOSHRSQ - is the square of the shareholdings of the CEO. 
EXT - measures the largest shareholding held by an institution, blockholder or 
individual outside the company. Quoted UK companies must publish 
information on all externally held shareholdings in excess of 3%. 
AUDADD - the average number of additional directorships of other UK plcs 
held by the non-executive members of the audit committee. It is a proxy for 
director calibre in the external labour market.  
AUDNX - is the percentage of non-executive directors on the audit committee. 
AUDINDNX - is the percentage of independent non-executive directors on the 
audit committee.  
AUDKEY - is a binary variable that has a value of one if a key director is on 
the audit committee and zero if there is not. A key director is defined as either 
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the CEO, executive chairman or finance director. Such a presence may inhibit 
the ability of the committee to monitor effectively the board. 
 PROBTO - measures take-over probability and is a proxy for the market for 
corporate control. It is defined as the number of firms in a specific industrial 
classification that were acquired during 1994 and 1995 as a proportion of the 
total number of firms in that group. The industrial classification is the two digit 
London Stock Exchange Industrial Classification with the initial population 
being the firms present in the 1994 list. The use of an industry-based measure 
of take-over intensity is consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), who 
also uses a two-digit industry definition, and Palepu (1986).3  
LEVERAGE - is the percentage of total debt to total assets.  
SALES -is the natural log of sales.  
CAPEX - is the ratio of net capital expenditure to total assets expressed as a 
percentage.  
 
The sample is constructed from the 1996 Times1000, which lists the largest 
companies operating in the UK. The sample consists of all quoted, non-
financial UK firms for which full information could be obtained covering the 
period 1994 and 1996. We therefore exclude companies that were not 
registered in the UK, had their shares suspended, were demerged, divested, 
acquired or were newly listed during the period. Financial companies were 
also excluded because they are subject to externally imposed scrutiny from 
organisations such as the Financial Securities Agency. The relationship 
between governance mechanisms and performance is therefore likely to be 
less clear cut for companies in that sector. Initially we obtained data on 321 
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companies but three were excluded because of extreme values and another 
seven were lost as a result of being acquired prior to the publication of their 
1996 results. This left a final sample of 311 companies. 
 
All performance data refer to the end of the 1996 financial year as reported in 
the companies’ financial statements. The governance data refer to the 
position at the end of the 1995 financial year as reported in the annual 
accounts. We chose this approach because it identifies the governance 
structures that are in place at the beginning of the relevant financial year and 
which were therefore responsible for overseeing company performance during 
that year.  
 
Financial data were taken from Primark Extel Company Analysis. This also 
provided details on sales, net capital expenditure and leverage. Merger 
information was taken from Acquisitions Monthly, which lists all mergers and 
acquisitions involving UK quoted companies. Industry definitions were 
measured by means of the London Stock Exchange Industrial Classification 
 
Data covering director calibre and independence were taken from the Price 
Waterhouse Corporate Register. It details the board structure of each 
company, including the name and number of executive and non-executive 
directors. The Register includes data covering the presence and structure of 
the audit committee. It also provides information on the current, and previous, 
posts held by directors. From this we calculated the average number of 
directorships held by the non-executive members of the audit committee. It 
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also allows us to identify non-executive directors who had previously been an 
executive director of the firm or who had held a senior post with a company’s 
advisors or auditors. Other biographical information includes the length of time 
a director has served on the board. The Register also provides information on 
the shareholdings of executive and non-executive directors. In addition it 
shows externally held shareholdings in excess of 3%.  
 
The general model, equation 1, was analysed using OLS. Given the 
prescriptive nature of the Code of Best Practice, it could be argued that the 
internal governance mechanisms are exogenous rather than endogenous. 
Using OLS would therefore be appropriate. However, two further models were 
also tested in an attempt to gain further insights into the relationships. First, 
equation 2 adds a lagged dependent variable to the model.  
 
QRATIOi = 0 + 1BOARD + 2INCENTIVE + 3QUALITY + 4COMMITTEE + 
5TAKEOVER + 6LEVERAGE + 7CONTROL  + 8LAG + i   (2) 
 
where:       
LAG - is the Q ratio lagged one year    
This tests the more commonly held view that the relationship between 
structural governance mechanisms and performance is endogenous. In the 
UK context, this approach takes account of the fact compliance with the Code 
of Best Practice is not compulsory, which gives companies a degree of 
autonomy in selecting an appropriate mix of internal mechanisms. If the 
relationship between board structure and performance is endogenous rather 
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than exogenous, ordinary least squares will yield biased and inconsistent 
results, Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991). Baysinger and Butler (1985) find a 
lagged relationship between board structure and performance. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) show that poor firm performance is more likely to result in 
outside directors joining the board and inside directors leaving the board. In 
contrast, Klein (1998) and Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) find no relationship 
between board composition and prior performance. There is therefore mixed 
evidence relating to the simultaneous nature of the governance-performance 
relationship. 
 
There are a number of techniques available to deal with the issue of 
simultaneously determined relationships. One method is to use two-stage 
least squares. However, because our model is constructed such that year t’s 
performance is dependent on year t-1’s governance structures, two-stage 
least squares cannot be used.4 We therefore introduce a lagged dependent 
variable into the model, as Klein (1998).  
 
The analysis was further developed by splitting the sample into performance 
deciles. A dummy variable, which had a value of one if a company was in the 
top performance decile and zero if it was in the bottom performance decile, 
was regressed against the governance control variables using logistic 
regression. If the internal and external governance control mechanisms are 
substitutes, different combinations of the mechanisms would be expected to 
be present in such extremes of performance. If there were no impact, the 
initial hypothesised relationships would be called into question.  
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The model tested is: 
Pr (DECILE) = 0 + 1BOARD + 2INCENTIVE + 3QUALITY + 
4COMMITTEE + 5TAKEOVER + 6LEVERAGE + 7CONTROL       (3)  
where: 
Pr(DECILE) - is the probability that a company will be in the top or bottom 
performance decile. 
4. RESULTS 
Table 1 presents an overview of the data. 
Insert Table 1 
Non-executive directors remain in the minority on UK boards with the average 
representation being 47%. These figures are consistent with Peasnell et al 
(1998) who find that non-executive directors make up 44% of UK boards. 
When the definition is altered to take account of director independence, we 
find that the figure falls to 42%. The vast majority of firms, some 96%, have an 
official audit committee, a finding in line with Conyon and Mallin (1997). This 
shows a substantial increase from the pre-Cadbury position when only 55% of 
large quoted firms reported having an audit committee, Collier (1992). The 
incidence of duality is relatively low with only 16% of the sample having the 
same person undertaking the combined roles of CEO and chairman. There is 
therefore evidence that UK firms exhibit structural governance mechanisms 
consistent with those recommended in the Code of Best Practice. 
 
Audit committee quality shows that the average number of additional 
directorships held by the committee’s non-executive directors is 1.4.  We also 
found that 8.7% of companies had audit committees, the members of which 
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had no additional directorships. Audit committees consist predominantly of 
non-executive directors. On average the composition of the committee was 
93% non-executive director, with 85% of the firms having a committee 
membership consisting wholly of non-executive directors. Thus the vast 
majority of companies comply with the Code of Best Practice in relation to 
audit committee membership. When independence is taken into account, the 
average non-executive director membership falls to 79%. This remains in 
excess of the recommendation that two-thirds of the non-executive directors 
should be independent. Furthermore, 52% of firms have committees that can 
be defined as completely independent. Contrary to Cadbury’s 
recommendations, we find that 15% of firms have a key director as a member 
of the audit committee.  
 
The take-over probability variable went from 0% to 50% indicating that take-
over activity differed across the different industrial classifications. Mean CEO 
shareholding is 2.54% but the median of 0.24% shows this to be skewed to 
the right. The average largest external shareholding is 10.85% with a median 
of 8%. The mean turnover is just over £2.2 billion. Net capital expenditure 
averaged 9.29% and the average leverage ratio was 20.02%.  
 
Insert Table 2 
The correlation matrix in Table 2 shows that there is evidence of 
multicollinearity between two groups of structural governance mechanisms. 
They are, first, between the two non-executive director variables, NX and 
INDNX and second, between the audit committee variables AUD and AUDNX; 
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and AUDIND AUDNX and AUDKEY. The variables are therefore included in 
separate equations throughout the following analysis. 
 
Insert Table 3 
The OLS regression results reported in Table 3 show that the proportion of 
non-executive directors has an insignificant effect on performance. However, 
as equation 2 shows, non-executive director independence is positive and 
significant at the 5% level. This supports the Cadbury view that independence 
is a desirable characteristic of non-executive directors. However, contrary to 
expectations, in neither of the equations does the presence of an audit 
committee or the absence of duality have a significant effect on performance.  
 
The take-over variable is insignificant in both equations. In addition, neither 
CEO shareholdings nor external shareholdings are significant in either of the 
equations. Contrary to the free cash flow hypothesis, leverage is negative and 
significant, a result also found by Dowen (1995), McConnell and Servaes 
(1995) and Short and Keasey (1999).5 The control variables sales and capital 
expenditure are significant in both models at 5% and 1% respectively. Both 
models have significant F values.  
 
Insert Table 4 
Given the very high adoption rate of audit committees shown in Table 1, its 
insignificance in explaining performance is not altogether unexpected because 
so few firms do not have this particular mechanism.6 If, as Cadbury claims, 
audit committees help to provide more effective financial monitoring and to 
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align shareholder and manager interests, the characteristics of audit 
committees would be expected to influence performance. As Table 4 shows, 
the analysis was extended to investigate the impact of the structure and 
quality of the audit committee on company performance. For companies 
without an audit committee, the structure and quality of the whole board is 
used instead because the board as a whole would have had to undertake the 
audit committee’s duties.  
 
 Director quality is insignificant in all three equations in Table 4. The high 
correlation between the other three audit committee structure variables 
identified in Table 2, is dealt with by entering them separately in different 
equations. Audit committee structure, whether measured by the proportion of 
non-executive directors, the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
or the presence of a key director on the committee, has no significant impact 
on performance.  
 
Take-over probability is also insignificant in all three equations. 
Shareholdings, both internally and externally held, remain insignificant. 
Leverage remains significant and negative and the control variables sales and 
capital expenditure are again significant. All three equations are significant at 
the 1% level.  
 
So far, the analysis has shown little evidence that the governance 
mechanisms identified by Cadbury, and included in the Code of Best Practice, 
are associated with superior performance. A number of further analyses were 
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therefore carried out to assess the robustness of the initial results. First, given 
that the Code is not compulsory, the simultaneous nature of the governance-
performance relationship was then investigated by including a lagged 
dependent variable.  
 
Insert Table 5 
As Table 5 shows, neither the proportion of non-executive directors nor the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors is significant in equations 6 
or 7 respectively. The same applies to the duality and audit committee 
variables in those equations. The other audit committee variables in equations 
8, 9 and 10 are also insignificant. The only exception is the average number 
of additional directorships held by audit committee members in equation 10, 
which is significant at 10%. These results support Vafeas and Theodorou 
(1998) who found little evidence that the structural mechanisms 
recommended by Cadbury affected performance and Weir and Laing (1999) 
who found that the nature of the governance-performance relationship did not 
appear to change with the implementation of Code of Best Practice.  
 
However, the take-over variable was found to be positive and significant at the 
5% level in all five equations. The positive coefficient means that increased 
merger activity within an industrial is perceived as increasing the probability of 
acquisition of the remaining firms in that sector. This puts pressure on the 
boards of other firms to improve performance or run the risk of being 
acquired, with the consequent possibility of job loss. Using an event study 
approach, Song and Walkling (2000), found that the rivals of acquisition 
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targets earned abnormal returns because of the new, increased probability 
that the rivals themselves will become take-over targets. Our results show that 
there is evidence of sustained improved performance over a longer period, at 
least up to two years, which is consistent with management reacting positively 
to the threat of take-over with a resulting improvement in performance.  
 
External shareholdings remain insignificant although there is now evidence of 
director entrenchment with CEOSQ being negative and significant at 5%. 
Although leverage remains negative, it now becomes either insignificant or 
only just significant at the 10% level. This is consistent with Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) and Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) who also found a 
weakening of the impact of debt when simultaneity was taken into account. All 
models are significant at the 1% level.  
 
The second analytical development involved splitting the sample into 
performance deciles. This enabled us to identify differences in the governance 
characteristics of the top and bottom 10% of performers. The logistic 
regression results are given in Table 6. 
 
Insert Table 6  
Equations 11-15 show, at best, a weak relationship between the internal 
governance relationships and performance. The board characteristics of firms 
in the two deciles appear to be similar. Thus duality has no adverse effect on 
performance, the presence of an audit committee is not significant and neither 
is there evidence that committee director quality has an effect on 
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performance, even when comparing the best and worst performers. It is also 
shown that the presence of a key director on the audit committee does not 
have an adverse effect on performance. The only differences relate to the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors in equation 12, and the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee in 
equation 14. Both show that firms in the top performance decile are more 
likely to have a greater proportion of independent non-executive directors and 
a greater proportion of independent members of the audit committee. Take-
over probability is insignificant in all equations suggesting that, at the 
extremes of performance, director independence and the market for corporate 
control may be substitute mechanisms. There are no differences in terms of 
shareholdings whether internally or externally held. Leverage  remains 
negative. 
 
5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A number of additional analyses were carried out to test the robustness of the 
results and to determine the extent to which they were sensitive to variable 
definition. First, to assess the sensitivity of the choice of dependent variable, 
the equations were re-estimated using an accounting performance measure, 
the return on assets, (Bhagat and Black 1998 and Klein 1998). The only 
difference occurred in the simultaneous equation model where external 
shareholdings became negative and significant at the 5% level. The choice of 
dependent variable therefore has little effect on the relationship between 
governance mechanisms and performance.  
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Second, the median of 0.24% shows that CEO shareholdings are skewed to 
the right. Regressions using the log of CEO shareholdings rather than just 
CEO shareholdings were therefore run. With the exception that the new 
variable became significant at the 5% level, none of the other governance 
variables were affected by the change. Third, CEO shareholdings were 
replaced by the total shareholdings of the board of directors, a measure that 
gives a more general indication of the impact of shareholdings on 
performance, Dowen (1995). The new variable did not affect the results.  
 
Fourth, the proportion of non-executive directors with fewer than four years on 
the board was used as an alternative measure of non-executive director 
independence, O’Sullivan and Wong (1999). Recently appointed non-
executive directors may be regarded as more independent because they are 
less likely to suffer from CEO capture (Cadbury 1992). This occurs because 
the longer a non-executive director sits on a board, the less likely they are to 
be independent. Informal relationships are likely to develop over time and 
greater familiarity may reduce objectivity. The new measure of independence 
did not affect the results. It was found to be insignificant in the OLS equations 
but significant when in the logistic equation. Thus overall, there is some 
evidence to suggest that non-executive director independence has an impact 
on performance and may therefore be regarded as a substitute for other 
governance mechanisms. 
 
Fifth, the same principle was applied to audit committee independence. The 
new variable measured the proportion of non-executive members of the audit 
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committee with less than four years on the board. The new definition was not 
statistically significant.  
 
Sixth, we analysed the impact of another measure of director quality - the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the audit committee who have 
additional directorships. Dowen (1995) found a weak relationship between this 
measure of quality and performance. The greater the proportion of committee 
members with additional directorships, the higher the quality of the committee 
and the better the company’s performance. However, this measure of director 
quality was also insignificant. Thus, with the exception of the weak result in 
equation 10, neither of the measures of director quality was found to play a 
part in determining company performance.  
 
Seventh, the analysis was extended to find out if they were sensitive to the 
definition of leverage. Two other definitions were included. The first defined 
leverage as long-term debt divided by market capitalisation and the second 
defined it as total liabilities divided by market capitalisation. The results were 
unaffected by the different measures with leverage remaining significant and 
negative as before.  
 
Eighth, an alternative approach is to measure take-over probability at the firm 
level rather than at the industry level.  Using an event study, Pound and 
Zeckhauser (1990) found that the average target experienced significant 
positive returns in the period prior to the publication of the take-over rumour. 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Kieschnick (1998) found that firms that go 
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private were more likely to have been the subject of a take-over bid or take-
over speculation than firms that remained public. Both studies used a dummy 
variable that took the value of one if a firm was either the subject of a take-
over bid or the subject of take-over speculation. We constructed four dummy 
variables to take account of take-over speculation. The first had a value of 
one if the company had been the subject of take-over rumours during 1995 
and zero if not. The second had a value of one if the company had been the 
subject of take-over speculation in 1996 and zero if not. The third had a value 
of one if there had been speculation in either 1995 or 1996 and zero if not. 
The fourth had a value of one if a company had been the subject of take-over 
rumours in both 1995 and 1996 and zero if not. Information regarding take-
over speculation was taken from the Financial Times.  
 
All of the variables were insignificant in all equations. The only exceptions 
were in the logistic regressions if the rumours had taken place in 1996, in 
which case the take-over variable was positive and significant at 1%. 
However, this is likely to be a consequence of the increase in the target’s 
share price that coincides with take-over rumours rather than being indicative 
of good performance. This is borne out by the fact that if the rumours occurred 
the year before, in 1995, the variable was insignificant.  
 
Gibbs (1993), however, argues that rumours and perceived threats should be 
discounted because they may result in measurement error. He proposes an 
alternative footsteps measure that only included failed tender offers. However, 
only four failed hostile bids were made for firms in the sample during the 
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period under investigation and so this particular measure could not be 
meaningfully tested.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has employed UK data to investigate the relationship between 
company performance and corporate governance control mechanisms. 
Although the findings are mixed, a number of interesting results have 
emerged from the study. First, it has been shown that there is little 
relationship between performance and board structure, a finding consistent 
with Klein (1998), Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and Dalton et al (1998). 
Second, it was found that audit committee structure had no effect on 
performance but there was a weak relationship between committee director 
quality and performance. Third, a negative relationship between leverage and 
performance was found. This is consistent with McConnell and Servaes 
(1995) who characterised the situation as one where firms forego projects 
with positive net present values because they have excessive debt. Fourth, 
CEO shareholdings show some evidence of entrenchment but external 
shareholdings were not found to have a significant monitoring effect. Fifth, 
there is evidence that the market for corporate control acts as an effective 
disciplinary mechanism, which is consistent with Fama (1980). Sixth, 
companies in the top performance decile have a greater proportion of 
independent directors both on their boards and on their audit committees. The 
results are robust across a number of variable definitions. 
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The results show that the relationship between governance mechanisms and 
performance is a complex one. They illustrate the importance of the influence 
of the market for corporate control in the UK and the extent to which 
governance mechanisms appear to be substitutes. They therefore raise 
questions about the efficiency of a policy that imposes prescribed internal 
governance structures on firms because such an approach creates difficulties 
when trying to assess the effectiveness of those mechanisms. Given our 
results, it is not clear how far compliance with the Code of Best Practice 
benefits shareholders’ interests, particularly as the market for corporate 
control is found to be an effective governance mechanism.  
 
It may be, however, that the board governance structures recommended in 
the Code are appropriate but, because of a lack of information about the non-
executive directors regarding their expertise and independence, inappropriate 
appointments are being made. The US system provides for greater disclosure 
of governance information and following this lead is one option. However, 
there is no consistency in US studies which suggests that merely providing 
further information may not be sufficient. It is therefore problematic as to 
whether or not additional information will necessarily be the best way to 
strengthen the link between internal corporate governance structures and 
shareholder interests. 
 
If general rules are inappropriate, it may be that a system that reflects the 
company-specific situation should be adopted. In other words, a particular 
governance structure may be appropriate for one firm but not for another. For 
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example, duality may have a positive impact on a company if the person is 
dynamic and talented but a negative one if the person is autocratic. How 
shareholders are supposed to differentiate between the two situations is not 
clear. Nevertheless an alternative more flexible approach, based on a 
recognition that governance mechanisms may vary according to specific 
circumstances may be appropriate, Short et al (1999). Although Cadbury 
recognises that flexibility should be a part of the governance system, the 
prescriptive nature of the Code does little to encourage such an approach. 
Our results lend weight to the need for greater flexibility in understanding how 
governance control mechanisms impact in particular circumstances.  
 
The study has a number of limitations that may point the way to further 
research. We use a single period time lag. However, it is possible that board 
actions will take longer than one year to have an effect. Therefore further 
analysis could be undertaken into the nature of any time lag involved. In 
addition, more refined measures of independence, for example looking at 
interlocking directorships, may shed further light on the impact of non-
executive directors. Further analysis of the nature of the interrelationships 
between governance mechanisms is another aspect of the research that 
should prove fruitful.  
 
The results have added to the policy debate concerning the appropriateness 
of different governance mechanisms and the extent of their substitutability. 
We have found that the widespread compliance with the Code of Best 
Practice makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the Code’s 
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governance mechanisms. Greater flexibility and a recognition that the mix of 
governance mechanisms may vary according to a firm’s specific 
circumstances offer a possible solution. It may be that a greater 
understanding of the process of the governance mechanisms is one way 
forward. What is clear is that much work needs to be done to understand how 
governance mechanisms actually work and the extent to which they are 
interdependent.  
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NOTES 
1. The Code of Best Practice was updated to take account of the other 
governance reports, Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998). It became the 
Combined Code in 1998.  We refer to the original Code because our data 
relate to the time when it was in operation.  
2. In the US, non-executive directors are referred to an outside directors and 
executive directors as inside directors. 
3. The take-over intensity variable takes account of industry effects. However, 
we also replaced the variable with one and two-digit industry dummies and 
reran the regressions. Although a small number of industries had a significant 
impact on performance, there was no evidence of widespread industry effects 
and the results did not affect the significance of the governance variables. 
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4. This is because one of the equations in the system would be specified such 
that the governance structure in t-1 would be dependent on performance in 
period t. 
5. McConnell and Servaes (1995) explain the negative relationship in terms of 
the conflicting impact of debt. Companies with high debt burdens must forego 
expenditure on projects that have positive net present values. This 
underinvestment means that firms with growth opportunities will exhibit a 
negative relationship between debt and firm value.  
6. Using a dummy variable that has a value of one for 96% of the sample may 
introduce bias in the model. The equations were estimated without the audit 
committee variable. The omission did not affect the significance of any of the 
variables. 
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Table 1  
Sample Profile: Governance and Control Characteristics 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
deviation 
 NX (%) 
 
0 83 47 13.3 
INDNX (%) 
 
0 75 42 14.9 
AUD 
 
0 1 0.96 0.20 
DUAL 
 
0 1 0.16 0.37 
AUDADD 
 
0 4.5 1.4 0.97 
AUDNX (%) 
 
0 100.0 93 19.7 
AUDIND (%) 
 
0 100.0 79 26.6 
AUDKEY  
 
0 1 0.15 0.36 
CEOSHR (%) 
 
0 56.19 2.54 7.34 
EXTSH (%) 
 
0 88.0 10.85 11.17 
SALES (£m) 
 
8 80097 2209.80 5889.56 
LEVERAGE 
(%) 
 
0 92.7 20.02 13.16 
CAPEX (%) 
 
-41.1 73.5 9.29 11.49 
PROBTO (%) 
 
0.0 50.0 8.3 7.3 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 NX INDN
X 
AUD DUAL AUDA
DD 
AUDN
X 
AUDI
ND 
AUDK
EY 
CEOS
H 
EXT LNS
AL 
LEVER
AGE 
CAP
EX 
PROB
TO 
NX  0.83 0.30 -0.13 0.04 0.39 0.25 -0.28 -0.27 0.13 0.08 0.14 -0.05 0.08 
INDNX 0.83  0.24 -0.11 0.09 0.32 0.59 -0.22 -0.20 0.15 0.11 0.18 -0.01 0.07 
AUD 0.30 0.24  -0.08 0.18 0.68 0.42 -0.48 -0.21 -0.08 0.22 0.08 -0.04 0.06 
DUAL -0.13 -0.11 0.08  0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.26 -0.02 0.01 -0.15 -0.03 -0.07 
AUDAD
D 
0.04 0.09 0.18 -0.04  0.25 0.25 -0.24 -0.14 -0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 -0.00 
AUDNX 0.39 0.32 0.68 -0.02 0.04  0.60 -0.85 -0.28 -0.06 0.26 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 
AUDIN
D 
0.25 0.59 0.42 -0.04 0.25 0.60  0.50 -0.16 0.01 0.21 0.14 -0.04 0.04 
AUDKE
Y 
-0.28 -0.22 -0.48 -0.02 -0.24 -0.85 -0.50  0.18 0.05 -0.22 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
CEOSH -0.27 -0.20 -0.21 0.26 -0.14 -0.28 -0.16 0.18  -0.10 -0.24 -0.09 0.07 -0.08 
EXT 0.13 0.15 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.05 0.10  -0.19 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 
LNSAL 0.08 0.11 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.26 0.21 -0.22 -0.24 -0.19  0.18 -0.07 -0.01 
LEVER
AGE 
0.14 0.18 0.08 -0.15 0.05 0.09 0.14 -0.04 -0.09 -0.06 0.18  0.26 0.03 
CAPEX -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.00 0.07 0.21  0.08 
PROBT
O 
0.08 0.07 0.06 -0.07 -0.00 0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.08  
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Table 3 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Governance Mechanisms on 
Performance 
 
 Equation (1) 
 
Equation (2)  
NX  0.0032 
(0.54) 
  
INDNX    0.0095 
(1.98)** 
 
AUD -0.8854 
(1.33) 
-0.7359 
(1.07) 
 
DUAL 0.1331 
(0.66) 
0.1455 
(0.72) 
 
PROBTO 0.7115 
(1.01) 
0.6472 
(0.92) 
 
CEOSHR  0.0006 
(0.01) 
0.0033 
(0.11) 
 
CEOSHRSQ  0.0006 
(0.66) 
-0.0006 
(0.66) 
 
EXTSH  -0.0018 
(0.22) 
-0.0037 
(0.45) 
 
LNSAL -0.1712 
(2.31)** 
-0.1764 
(2.36)** 
 
CAPEX 0.0305 
(3.88)*** 
0.0307 
(3.41)*** 
 
LEVERAGE -0.0118 
(2.00)** 
-0.0132 
(2.20)** 
 
CONSTANT 3.3154 
(4.01)*** 
3.2370 
(4.09)*** 
 
    
R2 22 23  
F Value 8.66*** 
 
9.12***  
 
 
***- significant at the 1% level: ** - significant at the 5% level. 
t values in parentheses calculated from heteroscedastic corrected standard 
errors (White 1980) 
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Table 4 
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Governance Mechanisms, Including 
Board Committee Structure and Quality, on Performance 
 
 Equation (3) Equation (4) Equation (5) 
 
AUDADD 0.1227 
(1.48) 
0.0839 
(1.02) 
0.1085 
(1.35) 
AUDNX -0.0050 
(0.84) 
  
AUDINDNX  0.0025 
(0.71) 
 
AUDKEY   0.1003 
(0.41) 
PROBTO 0.6968 
(1.00) 
0.5672 
(0.14) 
0.6260 
(0.89) 
CEOSHR 0.0020 
(0.06) 
0.0068 
(0.18) 
0.0056 
(0.15) 
CEOSHRSQ 0.0007 
(0.07) 
0.0006 
(0.60) 
0.0007 
(0.70) 
EXT -0.0001 
(0.00) 
-0.0007 
(0.09) 
-0.0002 
(0.02) 
LNSAL -0.1749 
(2.25)** 
-0.1970 
(2.55)** 
-0.1833 
(2.35)** 
CAPEX 0.0302 
(3.31)*** 
0.0307 
(3.37)*** 
0.0304 
(3.34)*** 
LEVERAGE -0.0125 
(2.08)** 
-0.0133 
(2.14)** 
-0.0128 
(2.16)** 
CONSTANT 4.2634 
(4.28)*** 
2.4961 
(4.31)*** 
2.5432 
(3.79)*** 
 
R2 21 21 21 
 
F value 9.28*** 9.15*** 9.06*** 
 
***- significant at the 1% level: ** - significant at the 5% level. 
t values in parentheses calculated from heteroscedastic corrected standard 
errors (White 1980) 
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Table 5 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression, Including Lagged Dependent Variable, of 
Governance Mechanisms on Performance 
 
 Equation 
(6) 
Equation 
(7) 
Equation (8) Equation (9)
 
Equation 
(10) 
NX -0.0006 
(0.20) 
    
INDNX  0.0021 
(0.70) 
   
AUD 0.4213 
(1.23) 
0.3725 
(1.11) 
   
DUAL 0.0883 
(0.67) 
0.0932 
(0.71) 
   
AUDADD   0.0813 
(1.60) 
0.0778 
(1.56) 
0.0830 
(1.69)* 
AUDNX   0.0022 
(0.66) 
  
AUDINDNX    0.0020 
(1.00) 
 
AUDKEY     -.01002 
(0.76) 
PROBTO 1.0242 
(2.05)** 
0.9977 
(2.00)** 
1.0403 
(2.08)** 
1.3037 
(2.56)** 
1.0620 
(2.09)** 
CEOSHR 0.0703 
(2.20)** 
0.0719 
(2.26)** 
0.0731 
(2.38)** 
0.0712 
(2.30)** 
0.0717 
(2.33)** 
CEOSHRSQ -0.0023 
(2.09)** 
-0.0023 
(2.09)** 
-0.0023 
(2.09)** 
-0.0020 
(2.00)** 
-0.0023 
(2.09)** 
EXT 0.0018 
(0.41) 
0.0012 
(0.27) 
0.0018 
(0.39) 
0.0014 
(0.29) 
0.0018 
(0.39) 
LNSAL -0.0493 
(1.29) 
-0.0505 
(1.53) 
-0.0463 
(1.40) 
-0.0486 
(1.45) 
-0.0458 
(1.35) 
CAPEX 0.0095 
(1.63) 
0.0097 
(1.64)* 
0.0093 
(1.63) 
0.0097 
(1.73)* 
0.0092 
(1.61) 
LEVERAGE -0.0057 
(1.62) 
-0.0061 
(1.65)* 
-0.0062 
(1.72)* 
-0.0066 
(1.73)* 
-0.0066 
(1.66)* 
LAG 0.7226 
(4.91)*** 
0.7196 
(4.85)*** 
0.7110 
(4.82)*** 
0.7060 
(4.77)*** 
0.7086 
(4.78)*** 
CONSTANT 0.3755 
(0.96) 
0.3313 
(0.95) 
0.4439 
(1.46) 
0.5265 
(2.01)** 
0.6630 
(2.06)** 
R2 70 68 69 69 69 
 
F value 60.32*** 60.46*** 67.04*** 67.23*** 66.92*** 
 
 
***- significant at the 1% level: ** - significant at the 5% level: * - significant at 
the 10% level. 
t values in parentheses calculated from heteroscedastic corrected standard 
errors (White 1980) 
 
  49
  50
Table 6 
Logistic Regression Analysis of the Influence of Governance Mechanisms on 
the  Probability of a Company being in the Top or Bottom Performance 
Deciles 
 
 Equation 
(11) 
 
Equation 
(12) 
Equation 
(13) 
Equation 
(14) 
Equation 
(15) 
NX 0.0141 
(0.33) 
    
INDNX  0.0502 
(3.66)* 
   
AUD 1.0722 
(0.64) 
0.5089 
(0.14) 
   
DUAL -0.1072 
(0.05) 
-0.3137 
(0.11) 
   
AUDADD   0.3324 
(0.89) 
0.2008 
(0.30) 
0.3183 
(0.84) 
AUDNX   0.0047 
(0.009) 
  
AUDINDNX    0.0235 
(2.85)* 
 
AUDKEY     -0.4951 
(0.60) 
PROBTO 4.6356 
(0.96) 
3.8930 
(0.71) 
5.8387 
(1.42) 
5.0713 
(1.09) 
5.6722 
(1.35) 
CEOSHR -0.0995 
(0.49) 
-0.0560 
(0.16) 
-0.1184 
(0.79) 
-0.1434 
(1.15) 
-0.1100 
(0.81) 
CEOSHRSQ 0.0031 
(0.38) 
0.0019 
(0.17) 
0.0034 
(0.49) 
0.0035 
(0.60) 
0.0033 
(0.49) 
EXT -0.-291 
(0.83) 
-0.0384 
(1.37) 
-0.0200 
(0.48) 
-0.0203 
(0.51) 
-0.0206 
(0.48) 
LNSAL -0.5505 
(3.84)** 
-0.6553 
(5.07)** 
-0.5350 
(3.19)* 
-0.7125 
(4.96)** 
-0.5503 
(3.39)* 
CAPEX 0.1276 
(12.40)*** 
0.1297 
(12.20)***
0.1230 
(11.39)*** 
0.1263 
(12.03)*** 
0.1239 
(11.51)*** 
LEVERAGE -0.0811 
(4.55)*** 
-0.0897 
(4.65)*** 
-0.0716 
(4.46)*** 
-0.0729 
(4.13)*** 
-0.0721 
(4.47)*** 
CONSTANT 2.1546 
(0.95) 
2.2581 
(1.10) 
2.4453 
(1.26) 
2.5085 
(1.41) 
3.1088 
(1.79) 
Nagelkerke R2 
 
 
54 
 
59 
 
55 
 
58 
 
55 
Model Chi square 35.36*** 39.19*** 35.35*** 38.10*** 35.53*** 
Classification 
(%) 
     
Top 77 81 74 77 74 
Bottom 86 77 89 92 89 
Overall 81 79 82 85 82 
 
***- significant at the 1% level: ** - significant at the 5% level: * - significant at 
the 10% level. 
Wald statistics in parenthesis 
